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Abstract. Inspired by the taxi refusal problem, we propose a double auction for taxi services 
with a variable supply-and-demand fare surcharge. In contrast to a conventional commodity 
double auction, our taxi service auction involves an opportunity cost that generally increases 
with time. Therefore, the bidding behaviour differs from that reported in the literature. We 
investigate experimentally the effects on bidding behaviour of the opportunity costs and 
private values of drivers and passengers, as well as of the types of given information. In 
addition, we compare the realized benefits between passengers and drivers. The results show 
that the degree of sensitivity to private value differs with opportunity cost and that 
transaction statistics vary with types of the information given to bidders. Moreover, we 
found that providing more information to bidders does not necessarily lead to better market 
performance and that giving suitable information to bidders could lead to a balanced benefit 
between passenger and driver. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Taxis are an important mode of transportation in the city of Bangkok in Thailand, often being the most 
convenient and comfortable way to travel within the city. However, statistics reveal that taxis account for 
75.7% of complaints about public transport [1]. In particular, customer complaints about being refused taxi 
service rose from 14.7% in 2010 to 44.10% in 2015 [1]. This was despite the 1,000 Baht fine (approximately 
30 USD) for refusing taxi service that was introduced in September 2012. 
Promprechawut (2006) [2] reported that 83.5% of interviewed taxi passengers in Bangkok cited taxi 
refusal as the problem that they encountered the most, particularly if the requested destination was in a 
congested area. Taxi refusal is also a major concern in other parts of the world, e.g. New York [3] and 
Australia [4]. One possible cause of taxi refusal is the fare, which is regulated by the government and may 
not correspond to actual supply and demand [3]. Another possible cause is a financial disincentive to 
providing the service, i.e. upon dropping off the passenger, the taxi driver does not want to be stuck in 
traffic or return with an empty cab [5]. Inherent to both these scenarios is the possibility of undesirably 
low revenue after deduction of service costs. Bruce and Jessop (2003) [6] reported the difficulties of taxi 
procurement in Australia. About half the failures to obtain service were those that occurred through a 
taxi call centre, a common problem being that prospective passengers would be told either that no taxis 
were available or that a taxi was on its way that subsequently did not materialise. Based on the results of 
these studies, the situation is expected to be even worse when two of the aforementioned situations occur 
simultaneously: the trip is to a congested area (or one that is remote and for which demand is low) and 
the passenger’s only realistic way of accessing a taxi service is by calling a taxi company. The latter situation 
is quite typical in Bangkok, where hailing a taxi is difficult for the many people who live far away from 
the main streets. Under such circumstances, passengers have to call a taxi company, thereby incurring a 
fixed surcharge (20 Baht) in addition to the regular metre fare. Despite this extra payment, drivers still 
often refuse to provide the service. Nattapongwipas (2009) [7] found taxi call centres turning away about 
20% of the prospective passengers who called during the morning peak, of whom 80% were given the 
explanation that no taxi was willing to pick them up. 
Pueboobpaphan and Indra-Payoong (2015) [8] proposed a demand–supply matching of taxi services by 
means of a double auction. Figure 1 illustrates a taxi auction system whereby passengers and drivers can offer 
and ask for a surcharge in addition to the regular metre fare known as a variable surcharge policy. The effects 
of given information and opportunity cost on bidding behaviour and market efficiency were examined by 
conducting laboratory experiments. Pueboobpaphan and Indra-Payoong (2015) [8] found that the proposed 
(variable) surcharge policy outperforms the existing (fixed) surcharge policy in several aspects and that 
different given information has significantly different effects on transaction price and time. In addition, 
opportunity cost does have an effect on individual bidding behaviour. However, Pueboobpaphan and Indra-
Payoong (2015) [8] considered only three different information levels and investigated only the main effect 
of opportunity cost. With a hypothesis that different information may lead to different behaviour and 
performance, the present paper extends the previous studies by considering new given information. It also 
explores in more detail the effect of opportunity cost on the behaviour of passenger and driver, as well as the 
interaction between opportunity cost and private value. In addition, the benefits of different given 
information to passenger and driver are compared to see whether there is any imbalance between the two 
parties. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Taxi service auction under double auction scheme. 
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This remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the related literature. 
Section 3 describes the experimental design in detail. Section 4 presents the new regression-based analytical 
models for quantifying the effect of interaction between private value and opportunity cost on transaction 
price and transaction time. Section 5 describes how passenger and driver benefits are determined. Section 
6 provides and discusses the results from regression analyses and benefit comparison. Finally, Section 7 
gives conclusions. 
 
2. Related Literature  
 
2.1. Taxi Studies 
 
Srisurapanon et al. (2006) [9] studied the application of information technology in improving taxi services 
and reported various statistics associated with the taxi industry in Bangkok. Most vehicles were operated in 
two 12-h shifts. The average driving distance for one shift was approximately 247.5 km, one third of which 
was driven with an empty cab. There were an estimated 1.07 million taxi trips per day in Bangkok, and the 
average taxi fare was about 112 Baht [10]. The taxi refusal problem was also reported in the same study. The 
taxi call centres had to turn away about 20% of passengers who called in the morning peak, 80% of whom 
were told that no taxi was willing to pick them up. The same reason accounted for 54% during the off-peak 
period. 
Various previous studies have dealt with taxi markets and their efficiency. The majority focused on the 
two main regulation issues: price and entry controls. To study price regulation and optimal service standard, 
Douglas (1972) [11] proposed an economic-based aggregate model of a taxi market. One important 
characteristic of that taxi market (in which a vacant taxi is engaged by being hailed) is that the passenger 
could not effectively transmit to the supplier his/her willingness to pay for a reduced waiting time. 
Following this work, several authors used a similar modelling approach to study the regulation of taxi 
markets [12, 13, 14 ]. However, one limitation of these aggregate models is that they do not consider the 
spatial structure of the taxi market, e.g. the road network and the origin/destination of the trips. Later, the 
alternative of applying network modelling to taxi services was proposed to deal explicitly with the spatial 
structure of the taxi market [15, 16, 17]. Yang et al. (2005) [18] extended this work by using a novel clock-
network model to consider the temporal variation of taxi supply and customer demand throughout the 
day. In more recent work, Yang et al. (2010) [19] studied nonlinear pricing to address the problem of the 
over-supply of long-distance taxi services, particularly to and from the airport in Hong Kong. The 
aforementioned studies share a common objective of studying the impact of regulation issues (entry and 
price controls) on the efficiency and level of service of the taxi market. To the best of our knowledge, no 
work has yet investigated the problem of taxi refusal in detail. 
 
2.2. Auction Studies 
 
The effect of information on bidding strategies and market efficiency has been the focus of previous research, 
mainly in the field of finance and stock exchanges. Such studies were mostly concerned with the effect of the 
information contained in the ‘limit order book’, which is a database that records all outstanding quotes (bids 
and asks) as well as their corresponding volumes, sorted so that the best quotes on both the bid and ask sides 
are on the top. Cao, Hansch and Wang (2009) [20] considered the information content of a limit order book 
using data from the Australian Stock Exchange. They found that information regarding the best bid, best 
offer and final transaction price contributed to approximately 78% of the market price, with the rest coming 
from the information contained in all other parts of the book. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) [21] also 
found the information in the limit order book to be informative for future price movements. Li and Zhang 
(2009) [22] compared the given information between two situations, i.e. before and after the top price levels 
shown to bidders are increased from three to five levels. They found that the fourth and fifth price levels are 
also informative to the price discovery process.  
Anufriev et al. (2011) [23] investigated the effect of information on market efficiency. With full 
information about the action of others, bidders tend to submit orders at a similar price to the previously 
observed transaction price. Without such information, however, bidders tend to submit orders at prices 
that are closer to their own valuations/costings, causing higher price volatility. In addition, Anufriev et al. 
(2011) [23] found that market efficiency was similar with or without the information. Cao, Hansch and 
Wang (2008) [24] studied the effect of information on bidding strategies using data from the Australian 
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Stock Exchange. They found that the best bid and the best ask always affected order submissions, 
cancellations and amendments, while the rest of the book (i.e. the subsequent price levels) affected only 
cancellations and amendments. These results signify that the more information that is given to bidders, the 
more it contributes to price discovery. Moreover, Cao, Hansch and Wang (2008) [24] found that bidders 
acted differently depending upon the type of information they obtained. However, there was no clear 
difference in market efficiency under different levels of information. 
 
2.3. Experimental Economic Studies 
 
The economic laboratory experiment has become a useful tool for evaluating policy proposals and a testing 
ground for institutional design [25, 26, 27]. It has been applied in areas such as food policy [28], emission 
control and trading [29, 30], fishery [31, 32] and irrigation [33]. To the best of our knowledge, auctions with 
opportunity cost considerations have not been studied explicitly until now. Katok and Kwasnica (2008) [34] 
investigated the effect of timing on revenue in a descending auction, and Kwasnica and Katok (2007) [35] 
studied the effect of timing on jump bidding in an ascending auction. Both were conducted under the premise 
that time is a valuable resource, and hence wasting time can be considered as incurring an opportunity cost. 
In a descending auction, clock speed can have a significant effect on price. In an ascending auction, bidders 
respond by bidding in larger increments when time is more valuable. However, Kwasnica and Katok (2007) 
[35] reported that opportunity cost does not have an effect on economic performance. Similar results in jump 
bidding were also found by Peng, Cai and Chen (2009) [36], i.e. when the value of time (opportunity cost) is 
high, jump bidding is preferred. Note that all of these results were obtained for some type of one-sided 
auction rather than for a double auction market.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
The experimental design adopted here follows that used previously by Pueboobpaphan and Indra-Payoong 
(2015) [28]: an electronic double auction system for a taxi service. For ease of illustration, a single 
origin/destination pair is considered for the taxi service auction in the present study. Through an online 
marketplace, passengers can bid a higher surcharge if they are in need of a taxi, whereas drivers can ask for a 
desired surcharge to cover their operating costs. 
The experiment was conducted at Suranaree University of Technology, Thailand using the z-Tree 
software system [37]. The bidders were undergraduate and master’s students from different faculties who 
had never participated in an economics experiment. There are advantages and disadvantages to using 
students as experimental subjects; this issue is still a topic of much debate in the experimental economics 
research community [27]. On one hand, there is no guarantee that the behaviour of students would be 
similar to that of professional bidders or direct stakeholders. On the other hand, using professional bidders 
as experimental subjects can also be criticized as being unreliable because, if the outcome of the research 
is to be used to set policy, professional subjects might respond in ways that would secure them a positive 
advantage. In contrast, Friedman and Cassar (2004) [27] noted that students tend to know little about the 
research hypothesis and so do not intentionally bias the results. 
Each session was conducted with 12 bidders chosen randomly upon arrival at the laboratory to form 
a group of six passengers (hereinafter called the ‘buyers’) and a group of six taxi drivers (hereinafter called 
the ‘sellers’). Each bidder retained his/her assigned role (i.e. buyer or seller) throughout the experiment. 
We recognise that demand for taxi services at peak times can be greater than supply, resulting in a taxi 
shortage. Thus, an experiment with the same number of passengers and drivers may not be a good 
representation of such a situation. Nevertheless, even without such an imbalance during off-peak times, 
taxi drivers still often refuse to pick up passengers, especially if the requested destination is in a highly 
congested or remote area. For this reason, the experiment in this study was designed to capture the taxi 
refusal problem during off-peak times for which the proposed auction mechanism is more pertinent. In 
addition, the current setup allows us to simplify the experiment and to analyse the effect of opportunity 
cost by making a direct comparison between our results and those of most previous studies, which used 
equal numbers of participants on both sides. A future experiment involving unequal supply/demand 
populations could be considered if so desired. 
Each session consisted of 15 consecutive auction periods, each of which lasted for 210 s. However, 
the actual time spent in a period may have been shorter if all offers were matched sooner. At the beginning 
of each session, the bidders were given a sheet of instructions to read. To make sure that the bidders 
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understood the trading rules properly, the instructions were also described by the experimenters, and each 
bidder was given an exercise to test his/her understanding. Finally, before running each experimental 
session, a pilot test was conducted whose results were not included in the analysis. 
In this study, two experimental factors were altered: the given information and the opportunity cost. 
Therefore, as shown in Table 1, the experiment consisted of eight sessions based on four levels of given 
information and whether or not the opportunity cost was considered. 
 
Table 1. Summary of experimental design. 
 
Given information 
Opportunity cost 
Without opportunity cost With opportunity cost 
Basic information (Basic) Session 1 Session 2 
Matched Price (MPrice) Session 3 Session 4 
Best Offer (BOffer) Session 5 Session 6 
Matched Price + Best Offer (Full) Session 7 Session 8 
 
3.1. Given Information 
 
The computer screen of each bidder showed information about the bidder’s private value, the remaining time 
in seconds and the offer status (whether or not the offer had been matched); there was also an input box in 
which the bidder could submit an offer. We refer to this bidder information as the ‘basic’ information. The 
screen could also show certain additional information that depended on which session was being considered. 
Buyers and sellers submitted their surcharge offers and the system showed the bidding results in real time, 
i.e. whether or not an offer had been matched. If an offer was not matched, the bidder was free to improve 
his/her offer by re-submitting the bid/ask as long as there was still auction time remaining. Each bidder 
could buy or sell no more than one unit of service in each period.  
Our experimental design considered four levels of given information. The first level, Basic, represents 
the case in which no bidder received any information other than the basic content described above. The 
matched-price level, hereinafter called MPrice, represents the case in which all bidders could see the last 
transaction price in real time in addition to Basic. The best-offer level, hereinafter called BOffer, represents 
the case in which all bidders could see the current best bid and the current best ask in real time, in addition 
to Basic. In the final level, MPrice + BOffer, also known as Full, the current best bid and the current best ask 
were displayed in real time, along with Basic and the last transaction price. 
 
3.2. Opportunity Cost 
 
Two options are considered for opportunity cost: with or without it. For the sessions with opportunity 
cost, each computer screen gave two additional pieces of information: a constant OCperiod, the total 
opportunity cost were the bidder to end the period without getting a service; and a variable OCelapsed, 
the opportunity cost that accrued linearly as time elapsed. The latter is the opportunity cost that accrues to 
the bidder in real time; OCelapsed = OCperiod at the end of the auction if the bidder did not get a service. 
The on-screen value of OCelapsed was updated every second. Note that different time-dependent 
functional forms of OCelapsed exist in reality. However, in this study, a linear function is assumed. A 
simplified computer screen for session 8 (Full information and with opportunity cost) is shown in Fig. 2. 
More details of the experimental set up can be found in the work of Pueboobpaphan (2014) [38]. 
To evaluate explicitly the effect of opportunity cost on bidding strategies in a thin market of six bidders 
on each side, we consider only the two extreme values of OCperiod, namely 50 and 150 experimental 
currency units (ECU) for the low and high opportunity cost, respectively. To determine the value of 
OCperiod for each bidder, a random value was drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1: 
OCperiod = 50 if the value was less than 0.5, OCperiod = 150 otherwise. In each session, the values of 
OCperiod differed throughout a sequence of auction periods. However, the same set of OCperiod values 
was used for all of the sessions with opportunity cost (sessions 2, 4, 6 and 8). In contrast to other studies, 
we allowed buyers/sellers to bid/ask higher/lower than their private value if they preferred. This condition 
was intended to capture the bidders’ bidding behaviour in relation to whether or not they were willing to 
lessen their loss from opportunity cost. 
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Fig. 2. Computer screen used in session 8 (Full, with opportunity cost). 
 
3.3. Private Value 
 
This research followed the general experimental guidelines of Friedman and Cassar (2004) [27]. The 
buyer’s values and seller’s costs were drawn independently for each period from a uniform distribution 
between 20 and 200 ECU. This same set of values was then used in all experimental sessions. Such 
parameters were private and not disclosed to other bidders during the experiment. The lowest value, 20 
ECU, corresponded to the current fixed surcharge for calling a taxi in Bangkok (20 Baht). The maximum 
surcharge rate was set to 200 ECU which is comparable to the average taxi fare [10]. It is important to note 
that selecting a particular surcharge range does not affect the general conclusions of this research because 
the same range was used in all sessions. 
 
3.4. Incentive 
 
During the laboratory experiments, giving/receiving a service has no intrinsic value to the bidders, so 
preferences for them had to be induced. The concept here comes from induced value theory [39], which 
Friedman and Cassar (2004) [27] describe as being ‘based on the idea that the proper use of a reward 
medium allows an experimenter to induce pre-specified characteristics in the subjects so that their innate 
characteristics become irrelevant’. Cash was used as a reward in this study. The amount paid to each bidder 
was a function of the bidder’s profit earned during the experiment. The profits for buyer and seller in each 
period in the case without opportunity cost are defined by Eq. (1) and (2), respectively, and in the case 
with opportunity cost by Eq. (3) and (4), respectively: 
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Here, Vb and Vs denote buyers’ and sellers’ private valuations, P denotes the transaction price, and cb(t) 
and cs(t) denote OCelapsed as a function of time t for buyer and seller, respectively. Profits from all periods 
are added and any loss incurred is subtracted. The higher the total profit the bidder earns, the more the 
bidder is rewarded. The total profit in ECU is then converted to Thai Baht currency. To encourage 
volunteers, bidders were also given a participation fee of 100 Baht. All cash rewards were paid at the 
conclusion of each experimental session. The bidders received payment ranging from 180 to 640 Baht, 
with an average of 350 Baht (US$1 was approximately 30 Baht at the time of the study). 
 
4. Regression Analysis 
 
In this section, we examine the effect of different given information, private values and the interaction 
between opportunity cost and private value on bidding strategies. At individual level, there are three levels 
of opportunity cost (OC): ‘without OC’, ‘low OC’ and ‘high OC’. As a result, the OC variable is 
manipulated as two dummy variables (low and high OC). There are also four levels of given information 
that are modelled using three dummy variables, namely MPrice, BOffer and Full. Using a subject’s transaction 
price or time as the dependent variable, the models are presented in Eq. (5) and (6). We consider two 
models, the second of which differs from the first by containing two additional terms that represent the 
interaction between opportunity cost and private value: 
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Here, for subject i ( }...,2,1,,...,2,1{ SBBBB NNNNNi  ), NB denotes the number of buyers 
who succeed at auction, NS the number of sellers who succeed at auction and j = transaction price or time, 
depending on which is being analysed:  
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5. Realized Benefit Comparison 
 
This section explains how we determine realized benefits, which are compared between buyers and sellers to 
see whether there is a preferential benefit to either side. In this study, the realized benefit can be separated 
into two parts: benefit from trading profit, and benefit from opportunity cost saving. Eq. (7) provides a 
mathematical description of how to determine the realized benefit in each time period p. These are then 
averaged separately for buyers and sellers and for different given information k. Finally, a t-test was used to 
examine whether there is a preferential benefit to either side: 
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Let p be the period index, j be the bidder index and k be the index of given information. Then npk 
represents the number of bidders who win the auction in period p in the market with given information k. 
Note that Eq. (7) considers only those bidders whose transactions were successful. Equation (3) or (4) 
is used to determine the trading profit indicated in the first term of Eq. (7), depending on whether the 
buyer or the seller is being considered. Inclusion of the second term was motivated by the fact that bidders 
are allowed to make negative trading profits to trade off the loss from opportunity cost. Thus, it is not 
sufficient to consider only the trading profit when describing the overall benefit. Therefore, the second 
term was proposed to capture the benefits of opportunity cost saving. Equation (8) provides a 
mathematical description of opportunity cost saving (OCsaving): 
 
 pjkpjkpjk OCelapsedOCperiodOCsaving  ,  (8) 
 
where p, j and k are the same as in Eq. (7), and the definition of OCperiod and OCelapsed are the same as 
described in Section 3. It is significant to note that OCsaving in the session can be determined using 
opportunity cost alone. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
In this section, the results of regression analyses are presented. Individual transaction price or time was 
considered as the dependent variable in the models. In addition, the comparisons between the realized 
benefits of buyers and sellers are presented. 
 
6.1. Individual Transaction Price 
 
The regression results for individual transaction price are given in Table 2 for both buyers and sellers. 
Several inferences can be made from this table. In general, the coefficients of common variables are 
consistent across all models. The signs of all variables are also intuitively consistent. Although the adjusted 
R2 is quite low compared to general regression studies, it is comparable to many results in the experimental 
economics literature (see, for example, Ketcham et al. (1984) [40]). Based on the adjusted R2 value, we 
conclude that model 2, which includes the interaction terms, is superior to model 1; all further discussions 
will be based on model 2. Discussions that are generic for both buyer and seller are given first, followed 
by buyer/seller-specific discussions about the interaction terms. 
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Table 2. Regression analysis of transaction price. 
 
Variable 
Coefficient (p-value) 
Buyer Seller 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 93.37 (0.00) 78.95 (0.00) 103.96 (0.00) 86.39 (0.00) 
PV 0.14 (0.00) 0.24 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) 
MPrice dummy −11.30 (0.00) −11.44 (0.00) −11.43 (0.00) −10.92 (0.00) 
BOffer dummy −0.72 (0.78) −0.76 (0.76) −0.10 (0.97) −0.42 (0.87) 
Full dummy −14.05 (0.00) −14.19 (0.00) −13.07 (0.00) −13.06 (0.00) 
OC_low dummy 8.77 (0.00) 17.64 (0.03) 0.59 (0.81) 28.48 (0.00) 
OC_high dummy 14.99 (0.00) 42.70 (0.00) 5.06 (0.02) 25.65 (0.00) 
OC_low dummy*PV  −0.05 (0.37)  −0.34 (0.00) 
OC_high dummy*PV  −0.21 (0.00)  −0.28 (0.00) 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.22 
 
We look first at the individual effect of each variable. As expected, Table 2 shows that private valuation 
is significant and affects the transaction price positively across all regressions. This implies that a buyer 
with a higher private value could afford to pay more for the service, whereas a seller whose costs were 
higher would naturally require a higher transaction price. The estimated information-type effects reveal 
that transaction prices under MPrice and Full information are significantly lower than prices under Basic 
information. However, the transaction prices under BOffer show no significant difference from the 
transaction prices under Basic information. From the buyer’s point of view, MPrice and Full information are 
more desirable because they lead to lower transaction prices than those under BOffer and Basic information. 
However, the seller would prefer only Basic information to be available, because this leads to higher 
transaction prices. 
Regarding the opportunity cost effect, it must be considered in conjunction with the interaction terms 
between opportunity cost and private value. By inserting the values of all coefficients that are statistically 
significant, the models for buyer’s and seller’s transaction prices are given by Eq. (9) and (10) respectively: 
 
 
iii
iiiiibuyer
PVhighOChighOC
lowOCFullMPricePVy
*_21.0_70.42
_64.1719.1444.1124.095.78


 (9) 
 
 
iiiii
iiiiiseller
PVhighOCPVlowOChighOC
lowOCFullMPricePVy
*_28.0*_34.0_65.25
_48.2806.1392.1039.039.86


 (10) 
 
Finally, the models can be distinguished by low or high opportunity cost by inserting the values of the 
opportunity-cost dummy variables. Equations (11) and (12) show the reduced model form of the 
transaction price for buyers and sellers, respectively: 
 
 






OChighhasibuyerifFullMPricePV
OClowhasibuyerifFullMPricePV
y
iii
iii
ibuyer
,19.1444.1103.065.121
,19.1444.1124.059.96
 (11) 
 
 






OChighhasisellerifFullMPricePV
OClowhasisellerifFullMPricePV
y
iii
iii
iseller
,06.1392.1011.004.112
,06.1392.1005.087.114
 (12) 
 
From Eq. (11), the intercept values imply that if the private value is close to zero and all else is equal, 
buyers with lower opportunity costs generally pay less than those with higher opportunity costs. The 
coefficients of private value in Eq. (11) reveal that buyer transaction price increases with private value. 
However, buyers with lower opportunity costs are more sensitive to private value than buyers with higher 
opportunity costs (0.24 compared with 0.03). When plotting Eq. (11) while considering the same level of 
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information, we obtain Fig. 3(a) and see that the two lines for low and high opportunity cost intersect at 
the private value of 119.3 ECU. Considering the region to the left of the intersection point, buyers with 
higher opportunity costs tend to pay more than those with lower opportunity costs. This is reasonable 
because buyers with higher opportunity costs are more concerned about saving on opportunity cost than 
about earning from buying at a price lower than the private value. Thus, such buyers offer at relatively high 
prices and see their offers being matched very quickly. In contrast, buyers with lower opportunity costs are 
in less of a hurry and therefore can wait to get a better price. As a result, such buyers tend to pay less than 
those with higher opportunity costs. 
Considering the region to the right of the intersection point (for buyers with private values larger than 
119.3 ECU), the tendency is opposite. Buyers with lower opportunity costs tend to pay more than those 
with higher opportunity costs. This result is striking at first sight and requires careful thought as to the 
underlying reason, which it is worth noting is related to the findings from transaction time analysis that are 
discussed in the next section. For the present purpose, these are described here briefly. In general, buyers 
with higher opportunity costs tend to leave the auction sooner than those with lower opportunity costs; 
the former might start by making an offer at a relatively high price and have it matched very quickly, thus 
reducing the number of remaining sellers in the market. As time progresses, the sellers that remain in the 
market are usually those with higher costs. In contrast, buyers with lower opportunity costs might start 
offering at a relatively low price and therefore experience difficulty in having their offers matched. As time 
progresses, they need to improve their offers in order to match them with those of the remaining sellers. 
As a result, for buyers with larger private values, those with lower opportunity costs tend to pay more than 
those with higher opportunity costs. 
Although the general tendencies are opposed, Eq. (12) and Fig. 3(b) for seller transaction price can be 
interpreted in much the same way as in the case of buyers, in which the two lines intersect at a private 
value of 47.2 ECU. To the left of the intersect point, sellers with higher opportunity costs tend to sell at a 
cheaper price than those with lower opportunity costs. This can be explained in a similar manner to that 
in the case of buyers, namely that sellers with higher opportunity costs are more concerned about 
opportunity-cost savings and thus are more willing to accept a lower price. To the right of the intersection 
point, sellers with higher opportunity costs tend to secure a higher price than those with lower opportunity 
costs. Once again, this result is striking at first sight but can be explained in a similar manner as in the case 
of buyers. The quick matching among the sellers with higher opportunity costs reduces the number of 
remaining buyers in the market. As time progresses, it becomes more difficult to find buyers with higher 
private values. As a result, sellers with lower opportunity costs need to decrease their price in order to be 
matched with the remaining buyers. Therefore, for sellers with large private values, those with lower 
opportunity costs tend to sell at a lower price than those with higher opportunity costs. 
 
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
 
Fig. 3. Interaction effect between opportunity cost and private value on bidder’s transaction price: (a) buyer’s 
transaction price (Eq. (11)); (b) seller’s transaction price (Eq. (12)). 
 
6.2. Individual Transaction Time 
 
Similar analysis was also made for individual transaction time; the results are given in Table 3 for both 
buyers and sellers. In the case of buyers, model 2 with the inclusion of interaction terms was preferred 
over model 1 because of the larger adjusted R2 value. However, in the case of sellers, model 1 was chosen 
as it is simpler and there is no difference in the adjusted R2 value. The effect of private value on transaction 
time is significant but different for the cases of buyers and sellers. A significant negative effect reveals that 
buyers with higher private values complete the auction earlier. In contrast, sellers with higher private values 
take longer to finish the auction because the estimated coefficient is significantly positive. This is logical 
because higher private values for sellers mean higher costs, and thus it is difficult for sellers to sell at prices 
that are higher than the cost. 
The estimated effect of different given information shows that transaction time is significantly longer 
for BOffer and Full information than for Basic information. However, there is no significant difference 
between transaction times for MPrice and Basic information. Based on this result, it can be said that MPrice 
and Basic are more desirable because they could lead to a shorter transaction time. 
Similar to transaction price, interpreting the effects of opportunity cost on transaction time requires 
consideration of the interaction between opportunity cost and private value. By following a similar 
procedure, Eq. (13) and (14) show the reduced models of transaction time for buyers and sellers, 
respectively: 
 
 






OChighhasibuyerifFullBOfferPV
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y
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,44.2204.2338.01.72
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 (13) 
 
 






OChighhasisellerifFullBOfferPV
OClowhasisellerifFullBOfferPV
y
iii
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,44.2233.2343.097.16
,44.2233.2343.055.7
 (14) 
 
In general, the effects of opportunity cost on individual transaction times are similar for buyers and 
sellers. It is found that opportunity cost has a significant negative effect on transaction time as revealed by 
the value of the intercepts. If the private value is close to zero and all else is equal, the transaction times of 
those with higher opportunity costs are shorter than those with lower opportunity costs. However, there 
is a small difference between buyers and sellers because the interaction term is statistically significant for 
buyers with higher opportunity costs but not for sellers. The coefficients of private value in Eq. (13) reveal 
that buyers with lower opportunity costs are more sensitive to private value than are those with higher 
opportunity costs, and thus have a sharper decrease in transaction time with increasing private value. 
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Table 3. Regression analysis of transaction time. 
 
Variable 
Coefficient (p-value) 
Buyer Seller 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 145.32 (0.00) 180.13 (0.00) 31.52 (0.00) 26.50 (0.00) 
PV −0.56 (0.00) −0.79 (0.00) 0.43 (0.00) 0.50 (0.00) 
MPrice dummy 3.14 (0.55) 3.48 (0.51) 3.75 (0.50) 3.83 (0.49) 
BOffer dummy 23.13 (0.00) 23.04 (0.00) 23.33 (0.00) 23.31 (0.00) 
Full dummy 22.44 (0.00) 22.44 (0.00) 22.44 (0.00) 22.55 (0.00) 
OC_low dummy −41.72 (0.00) −71.76 (0.00) −39.07 (0.00) −36.94 (0.00) 
OC_high dummy −52.13 (0.00) −108.03 (0.00) −48.49 (0.00) −37.70 (0.00) 
OC_low dummy*PV  0.19 (0.10)  −0.05 (0.72) 
OC_high dummy*PV  0.41 (0.00)  −0.13 (0.30) 
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.33 0.24 0.24 
 
6.3. Realized Benefit Comparison 
 
Table 4 gives the average and standard deviation of the realized benefits of buyers and sellers under 
different given information. From this table, it is observed that the realized benefit of buyers differs from 
that of sellers only in the cases of Basic and BOffer information. Under these sets of information, sellers 
(taxi drivers) seem to gain more benefit than buyers (passengers). When looking at MPrice and Full 
information, no significant difference is found under these cases. This suggests that MPrice and Full would 
be more desirable as they lead to indifferent benefits for both sides. In addition, MPrice and Full information 
also pose some desired properties as reported by Pueboobpaphan and Indra-Payoong (2015) [8]. The 
MPrice information leads to the highest total trade volume as well as to quicker order matching, and 
therefore to quicker transactions. In contrast, Full information leads to the lowest average transaction price 
but to the slowest transactions. Based on these results, MPrice would be more desirable. 
 
Table 4. Average realized benefit for buyers and sellers under different given information. 
 
Given Information 
Average realized benefit, ECU (Standard Deviation) 
p-value 
Buyer Seller 
Basic 78.94 (78.42) 107.56 (78.34) 0.02 
MPrice 86.35 (70.98) 90.71 (79.12) 0.70 
BOffer 76.36 (64.14) 104.23 (84.90) 0.02 
Full 107.42 (63.65) 90.51 (79.48) 0.15 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This research was motivated by the taxi refusal problem that is faced particularly by passengers with limited 
access to taxi services or whose destination is in a congested or remote area. A supply-and-demand approach 
was proposed to match taxi services through a double auction framework in which both passenger and driver 
could negotiate a surcharge to be paid on top of the regular metre fare. As opposed to the existing fixed-
surcharge policy, the proposed approach is equivalent to a variable surcharge policy in which passengers can 
offer a higher surcharge if in need of taxi services, whereas drivers can request a surcharge to compensate for 
disincentives. Such a taxi service auction involves opportunity costs that generally increase with time. 
Therefore, bidder behaviour in the auction may differ from those found in the literature. Laboratory 
experiments were conducted to examine the design of information that could be given to bidders. As a further 
extension of our previous study, this paper explored in more detail the effect of opportunity cost on the 
behaviour of passengers and drivers, as well as the effect of the interaction between opportunity cost and 
private value. The important findings are discussed below. 
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Despite conducting a more detailed regression analysis, the effects of different given information on 
transaction prices and times remain the same as in our previous study. Providing users with MPrice or Full 
information results in a significantly lower transaction price than that with Basic and BOffer information. In 
addition, transactions under BOffer and Full information take significantly longer than those under Basic 
and MPrice information. Based on these findings, if the system designer intends to give preference to 
passengers, the best option would be to provide users with MPrice information because this leads to lower 
transaction prices and quicker transactions. 
It is found that the effect of private value on the transaction prices of both buyers and sellers is 
significant in the positive sense. This implies that buyers with higher private values could afford to pay 
more for the services, whereas sellers with higher costs would naturally require higher transaction prices. 
However, the degree of sensitivity to private value differs under different opportunity costs. Under some 
circumstances, the results are striking at first sight. Compared to those with lower opportunity costs, buyers 
with higher opportunity costs can secure a cheaper price and sellers with higher opportunity costs can sell 
at a higher price. It seems that a higher opportunity cost stimulates the subjects to make a quick match 
and, as a result, reduces the chances of those remaining in the market securing a good price. This finding 
provides further insight into the behaviour of subjects in relation to opportunity cost. 
The effect of private value on transaction time is significant but different for buyers and sellers. A 
significant negative effect reveals that buyers with higher private values would complete the auction earlier. 
In contrast, sellers with higher private values would take longer to finish the auction because the estimated 
coefficient is significantly positive. The effect of opportunity cost is also significant; transactions tend to 
be quicker for larger opportunity costs. Different degrees of sensitivity to private value were also observed 
for buyers under different opportunity-cost levels. Buyers with lower opportunity costs were more sensitive 
to private value than were those with higher opportunity costs.  
The realized benefits for buyers and sellers were compared to see whether there was any imbalance 
between the two sides. It was found that MPrice and Full information would be more desirable because 
they lead to indifferent benefit between both sides. However, MPrice is superior to the other types of 
information; our previous study also indicated that it dominates in respect of some other benefits. 
The striking results discussed during the analysis of transaction price were based on experiments with 
a thin market. Although the literature suggests that this market size is sufficient to generate a competitive 
market, it may not be the case in this study because bidders too are subject to opportunity cost. In future 
research, we intend to conduct experiments with larger markets in order to test the above results. 
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